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AN EASY CASE MAKES BAD LAW: THE MISAPPLICATION OF 
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY IN MAXWELL’S PIC-PAC, INC. V. 
DEHNER, 887 F. SUPP. 2D 733 (W.D. KY. 2012) 
Colin P. Pool∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Expressing displeasure or incredulity with “dumb laws” is a common 
pastime; there are, in fact, entire books devoted to the subject.1  
Restrictions on the sale of alcohol are particular targets for derision, 
either because of their apparent basis in a moral disapproval of alcohol 
or because of the inconvenience they create for consumers.2  Just such a 
“dumb” restriction was at the center of a recent Western District of 
Kentucky decision.  In striking down this restriction, the court followed 
other lower federal courts in determining that some laws are so bad that 
they run afoul of the U.S. Constitution.  However, these purportedly 
innocuous decisions could have far-reaching implications.  
On January 10, 2011, The Food With Wine Coalition (FWWC), a 
Kentucky nonprofit corporation, along with Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc., a 
Kentucky corporation that owns and operates a grocery store in 
Louisville, Kentucky, filed a complaint against the state of Kentucky 
alleging that a provision of the state’s liquor control regulations violated 
the Equal Protection provisions of the United States and Kentucky 
Constitutions.3  Specifically, the complaint alleged that Kentucky 
Revised Statute § 243.230(5), which prohibits grocery stores and gas 
stations from selling wine and liquor but potentially allows all other 
retailers to do so, creates a classification that lacks a rational relationship 
to a legitimate state interest.4  Prior to filing suit, FWWC had lobbied 
the state legislature to allow grocery stores to sell wine.5  The failure of 
these efforts led the plaintiffs to seek relief from the courts.6 
 
 ∗ Associate Member, 2012–2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like 
to thank Clark Neily and Professor Chris Bryant for their assistance. 
 1. See, e.g., JEFF KOON, ANDY POWELL & WARD SCHUMAKER, YOU MAY NOT TIE AN 
ALLIGATOR TO A FIRE HYDRANT: 101 REAL DUMB LAWS (2002).  
 2. See, e.g., Editorial, Repeal of Sunday Restriction on Alcohol Sales Is Overdue, DANBURY 
NEWS-TIMES, May 2, 2012, http://www.newstimes.com/default/article/Repeal-of-Sunday-restriction-on-
alcohol-sales-is-3528534.php. 
 3. Complaint at ¶¶5, 6, 19, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 
2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H). 
 4. Id. at ¶19.  
 5. Intervening Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 2, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (No. 3:11CV-
18-H). 
 6. Id. at 5.  
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Within a month, Liquor Outlet, L.L.C. d/b/a The Party Source, which 
operates a liquor store in Bellevue, Kentucky, had moved to intervene as 
a defendant in the dispute.7  The Party Source believed that the state 
could not adequately represent its interest in the continuance of the 
Kentucky alcohol regulation scheme because the state had no economic 
interest to protect in the litigation.8  After the motion to intervene was 
sustained, all parties moved for summary judgment, agreeing that no 
material facts were contested and that the dispute could be settled as a 
matter of law.9  
On August 14, 2012, the Western District of Kentucky found in favor 
of the plaintiffs and struck down the statute.10  While acknowledging 
that the type of judicial review required in cases challenging economic 
regulations accords tremendous deference to the legislature, it also 
asserted that such deference is not an abdication of judicial review.11  In 
deciding the case in this manner, the court joined a growing trend 
among lower federal courts by applying a more exacting standard of 
judicial review to economic legislation than is typical in modern 
constitutional jurisprudence.12  As such, the case raises age-old 
questions regarding the proper role of the judiciary in the protection of 
economic liberty.13  The decision is particularly interesting because of 
its impending appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which has recently shown a 
willingness to strike down economic legislation on Equal Protection 
grounds.14  Were the Sixth Circuit to affirm the decision of the trial 
court, it would exacerbate a circuit split on the question of economic 
Equal Protection, thus calling the future of Equal Protection 
jurisprudence into doubt.15 
Part II of this Note will examine the Kentucky statute in question and 
the relevant constitutional issues.  Part III will discuss the district court’s 
decision in depth.  Finally, Parts IV and V will discuss the 
jurisprudential questions the case raises and conclude that, while the 
 
 7. Motion to Intervene, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 
2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H). 
 8. Id. at ¶¶13, 22. 
 9. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 739 (W.D. Ky. 2012). 
 10. Id. at 752.   
 11. Id. at 751. 
 12. See infra Part II.B.   
 13. See, e.g., PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL (1998); 
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).  
 14. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).  
 15. See, e.g., Brianne J. Gorod, Note, Does Lochner Live? The Disturbing Implications of 
Craigmiles v. Giles, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 537 (2003); Lana Harfoush, Comment, Grave 
Consequences for Economic Liberty: The Funeral Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing 
Scheme, the Circuit Split, and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135 (2011).  
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trial court decided the case against the weight of Supreme Court 
precedent, there is a possible avenue under the Kentucky Constitution to 
properly strike the law.  
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND TO MAXWELL’S 
A. The Kentucky Statute and its Accompanying Regulation 
The first iteration of Kentucky Revised Statute § 243.230, which 
controls eligibility for retail package licenses,16 was enacted in 1938.17  
That statute, like the current one, specifically prohibited “grocery store[s 
and] filling station[s]” from obtaining package licenses.18  The reason 
for creating this classification is unknown.  The distinction between 
grocery stores and other retailers is perhaps a remnant of the practice 
during Prohibition where drugstores were still allowed to sell alcohol by 
prescription for “medicinal purposes.”19  The statute’s current language 
reads as follows:  
No retail package or drink license for the sale of distilled spirits or wine 
shall be issued for any premises used as or in connection with the 
operation of any business in which a substantial part of the commercial 
transaction consists of selling at retail staple groceries or gasoline and 
lubricating oil.20 
Kentucky regulations enacted in 1985 further clarify the terms 
“substantial part of the commercial transaction” (“ten percent or greater 
of the gross sales receipts as determined on a monthly basis”)21 and 
“staple groceries” (“any food or food product intended for human 
consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, soft drinks, candy, 
hot foods, and food products prepared for immediate 
consumption”).22  
An effect of the statute and its accompanying regulation is that 
drugstores and convenience stores that do not sell gasoline are permitted 
to apply for a retail package license while grocery stores and gas stations 
 
 16. Kentucky licenses wine and liquor sales through a single retail package license.  Maxwell’s 
Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (W.D. Ky. 2012).  Thus, the denial of a retail package 
license prevents a retailer from selling both wine and liquor.  The types of retailers who can sell malt 
beverages are not restricted in the same manner.  See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.280 (West 1998).  
 17. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 740. 
 18. Id.  
 19. See id. at 741.   
 20. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.230(5). 
 21. 804 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 4:270 § 1 (1985). 
 22. Id. § 2. 
3
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are not.23  The crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint was that this 
classification system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.24  
B. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides in part: “No State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”25  This language 
“is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike;”26 the government may not classify persons based on 
impermissible or arbitrary criteria.27  Since 1937, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in this area has established a three-tiered system of 
judicial review.28  The highest tier, known as “strict scrutiny,” is used 
when a legislative classification distinguishes between persons on a 
suspect basis or infringes a person’s ability to exercise a fundamental 
right.29  The middle tier, “intermediate scrutiny,” is used for 
classifications which distinguish between persons on a “quasi-suspect” 
basis.30  The lowest tier, “rational basis review,” is used for general 
economic and social welfare legislation which does not involve 
fundamental rights or suspect classes.31  
During the so-called Lochner era (ca. 1900–1937),32 the Supreme 
Court would often choose not to defer to the opinion of the other 
branches of government when ruling on economic regulations due to a 
 
 23. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 738–39. 
 24. Id. at 743. 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
 26. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  
 27. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.2(a) (5th ed. 2012), available at Westlaw 3 TREATISE ON CONST. L. 
§ 18.2(a). 
 28. Id. § 18.3(a)(i). 
 29. Id. § 18.3(a)(iii).  Suspect classes are those based on race and/or national origin.  Id.  
“Fundamental rights” include freedom of association, the right to vote and participate in the electoral 
process, interstate travel, a right to fairness in procedure, and a right to privacy.  Id. § 15.7.  
 30. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. “Quasi-suspect” 
classes are those based on gender or legitimacy of birth.  ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, 
§ 18.3(a)(iv). 
 31. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, § 18.3(a)(ii).  
 32. This period takes its name from the seminal case Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), 
where the Supreme Court held that liberty of contract was a fundamental right under a theory of 
substantive due process.  The decision instituted an era of economic substantive due process, where 
exacting standards of judicial review were applied to economic legislation, that has proved to be one of 
the most criticized and controversial eras in Supreme Court jurisprudence.  For detailed discussion of 
Lochner and its legacy see KENS, supra note 13.  
4
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belief that economic rights were “fundamental.”33  Since 1937,34 with 
the Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the standard for 
rational basis review has been extremely deferential to the legislature: a 
classification’s validity is presumed, and it must only be rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest to be upheld.35  Such regulations 
may be based on “rational speculation unsupported by evidence and 
empirical data” and will fail only if there is no “reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”36  
In addition, the challenging party must negate every conceivable basis 
which might support the statute.37  
The classic example of the Court’s application of this standard to 
economic legislation is in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,38 
where an Oklahoma statute prevented opticians from fitting eyeglass 
lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or optometrist.39  
The district court held that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause 
since it subjected opticians to the regulatory system but exempted sellers 
of ready-to-wear glasses.40  The Supreme Court, however, overturned 
this decision, holding that, while the statute “may exact a needless, 
wasteful requirement,” it “need not be in every respect logically 
consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is enough that there is an 
evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”41  The 
Court also held that in correcting such evils, the legislature may enact 
different remedies for different problems, and may take “one step at a 
time.”42  In short, “[t]he prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes 
no further than the invidious discrimination”43 and “for protection 
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to 
 
 33. See Gorod, supra note 15, at 539.  
 34. The end of the Lochner era coincided with the Court’s opposition to President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation.  Roosevelt responded with his “Court Packing Plan.”  See WILLIAM 
E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL: 1932–1940, at 231–38 (1963).  The 
conventional wisdom holds that the Court’s ideological shift away from stringent judicial review 
following Roosevelt’s proposal was a response calculated to preserve the Court’s integrity as a neutral 
arbiter of constitutional issues, though this reading of history is disputed.  See, e.g., id.; BARRY 
CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 
(1998).  
 35. Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988).  
 36. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 315 (1993).  
 37. Id. at 315. 
 38. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).  
 39. Id. at 486.  
 40. Id. at 488.  
 41. Id. at 487–88.  
 42. Id. at 489.  
 43. Id. 
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the courts.”44  The result is that classifications held to the rational basis 
test will almost always be upheld, making this type of review a “virtual 
rubber stamp.”45   
However, the Court has not always deferred to the legislature when 
engaging in rational basis review.46  In City of Cleburne, Texas v. 
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Court, ostensibly using rational basis 
review, invalidated the requirement that a home for the mentally 
disabled could be constructed only with a special use permit.47  Justice 
Marshall noted in his concurrence that the standard the Court used in its 
decision was not the “traditional” rational basis test used in 
Williamson.48  He explained that the Court’s close analysis of the 
evidentiary record to determine the legislation’s factual foundation, and 
its expression of disbelief in the necessity of the statute, constituted the 
use of a more powerful scrutiny even if the majority expressly denied it 
was doing so.49  Marshall warned that such action by the Court created 
precedent which would encourage federal courts to “subject economic 
and commercial classifications to similar and searching ‘ordinary’ 
rational-basis review,” without “provid[ing a] principled foundation for 
determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.”50  
This heightened form of rational basis review, sometimes called 
“rational basis with bite,” was later used by the Court in Romer v. Evans 
to strike down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that 
disadvantaged homosexual and bisexual individuals,51 and in Lawrence 
v. Texas to invalidate state laws which criminalized consensual 
sodomy.52  These rational basis with bite decisions are characterized by 
a search for the actual purpose of the law, a careful evaluation of 
whether that purpose is permissible, and a review of the record for 
 
 44. Id. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876)).   
 45. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 79 
(1997).  
 46. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357 (1999).  According to Farrell, there were 110 
rational basis cases from 1971 through 1996, ten of which were successful for the plaintiffs.  
 47. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985). 
 48. Id. at 458–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 49. Id. at 457–60.  
 50. Id. at 460.  
 51. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 52. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The Court did not articulate what standard it 
was using to invalidate the law in Lawrence.  It is presumed that the Court was applying so-called 
“rational basis with bite.”  See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the 
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on 
Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005).  The Court also used a substantive due 
process theory rather than an equal protection theory to decide the case.  However, Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence used an equal protection theory, Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579, and, regardless, the rational 
basis standard for substantive due process is identical to the standard used for equal protection.  
6
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factual evidence of a bona fide correlation between classification and 
purpose.53  While scholars, commentators, and other federal judges have 
identified the use of this heightened form of rational basis review,54 it is 
important to note that the Court has never acknowledged its existence in 
a majority opinion.55 
While the modern Court has not used rational basis with bite to 
invalidate purely economic regulations,56 several lower courts, in 
fulfillment of Justice Marshall’s prophecy, have begun to apply this 
standard to such laws.57  Perhaps the most notable example came in 
Craigmiles v. Giles,58 a 2002 Sixth Circuit case involving a Tennessee 
statute that allowed only licensed funeral directors to sell caskets, urns, 
and other funeral merchandise.59  As a result, retailers who sold such 
merchandise, but did not engage in embalming, cremation, or other 
funeral services, could not participate in the casket market,60 giving 
licensed funeral directors a monopoly.61  This was a particularly 
burdensome requirement because state law required two years of 
training to become a licensed funeral director.62  
While noting that only a handful of statutes have been invalidated 
using rational basis review, the Sixth Circuit nevertheless invalidated the 
Tennessee statute on this ground.63  It agreed with the district court’s 
finding that the law did not promote public health or safety, and that the 
only practical difference between the plaintiffs’ caskets and those sold 
by licensed funeral directors was that the latter’s were “systematically 
 
 53. Farrell, supra note 46, at 359, 373.  
 54. See Smith, supra note 52, at 2770; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 55. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2004).  
 56. Id. at 1224.  However, the Court invalidated an economic regulation using what appeared to 
be a heightened form of rational basis review in Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), a 
case involving an Alabama statute that taxed out-of-state insurance companies on gross premiums more 
heavily than Alabama-based insurers.  The Court found this statute to fail rational basis equal protection 
analysis.  This decision appears to be an outlier, since later in the same term, the Court unanimously 
found similar legislation to pass rational basis review.  See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of 
Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985).  See also id. at 179–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Gail Lynn 
Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 
798–800 (1987).  The Court has not applied rational basis with bite to any economic regulations since 
1985.  Perhaps it is significant that the Metro. Life decision predated the Cleburne decision by 
approximately three months.  
 57. See Anthony B. Sanders, Comment, Exhumation Through Burial: How Challenging Casket 
Regulations Helped Unearth Economic Substantive Due Process in Craigmiles v. Giles, 88 MINN. L. 
REV. 668, 678 (2004). 
 58. Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002).  
 59. Id. at 222–23.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 229. 
 62. Id. at 222, 224.  
 63. Id. at 225.  
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more expensive.”64  Finding that the law’s only purpose was to 
“privilege certain businessmen over others at the expense of 
consumers,” the court held the law lacked a legitimate purpose and 
therefore failed rational basis review.65  The court took care to assert 
that its holding was “not a return to Lochner,” but also that “rational 
basis review, while deferential, is not toothless.”66  Nevertheless, several 
commentators noted that the Sixth Circuit was clearly using a more 
exacting standard of review in Craigmiles, thus implying a step back 
towards the Lochner era.67  
Through happenstance, a casket regulation would be the centerpiece 
of the next major case involving Equal Protection and economic 
legislation.  In Powers v. Harris, involving an Oklahoma statute 
practically identical to that in Craigmiles, the Tenth Circuit disagreed 
with the Sixth Circuit’s ruling and found that intrastate economic 
protectionism was a legitimate state interest.68  It also found that the 
Sixth Circuit’s focus on the legislature’s actual motives in enacting the 
statute was barred by traditional rational basis review and that its 
reliance on Cleburne as a model was unwarranted.69  The court felt that 
even if Cleburne and Romer signaled the creation of a more exacting 
form of rational basis review, Supreme Court jurisprudence limited its 
use to classifications that merit such scrutiny, which the court felt did 
not include economic classifications.70  Alternatively, the court 
reasoned, the so-called rational basis with bite of Cleburne and Romer 
may just be normal rational basis applied to situations where the only 
conceivable state interest was to harm a politically unpopular group.71  
In either case, the court declined to examine the Oklahoma statute under 
anything other than traditional rational basis review and upheld the law, 
finding that “intrastate economic protectionism, absent a violation of a 
specific federal statutory or constitutional provision, is a legitimate state 
interest and that the [Oklahoma statute was] rationally related to this 
legitimate end.”72 
 
 64. Id. at 225–26.  
 65. Id. at 229.  
 66. Id. 
 67. E.g., Gorod, supra note 15, at 541; Sanders, supra note 57, at 693. 
 68. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004).  Interstate economic 
protectionism is usually invalidated under the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Granholm v. Heald, 544 
U.S. 460 (2005), or when employment is involved, under the Article IV, § 2 Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, see United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of 
Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).  
 69. Powers, 379 F.3d at 1223.  
 70. Id. at 1224.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 1225. 
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The Supreme Court denied certiorari to Powers, declining to resolve a 
circuit split on the question of whether intrastate economic 
protectionism is a legitimate state interest.73  Since then, other federal 
courts have addressed challenges to economic regulation on Equal 
Protection grounds.  For example, in Merrifield v. Lockyer, the Ninth 
Circuit struck down a California pest control licensing regime that 
exempted those who controlled bats, raccoons, skunks, and squirrels 
without the use of pesticides, but specifically did not exempt those who 
controlled rats, mice, and pigeons without the use of pesticides.74  The 
court found that, like in Craigmiles, the singling out of three types of 
pests from other vertebrates was an unacceptable form of economic 
protectionism.75  The court also followed Craigmiles in asserting that its 
decision was not a return to Lochner, directly quoting the relevant 
language from the Craigmiles opinion.76  
Another recent case, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, followed 
Craigmiles in striking down a Louisiana law that permitted only state-
licensed funeral directors to sell caskets.77  The Fifth Circuit found there 
was no rational relationship between the state’s interests in consumer 
protection and public health and safety, and the limitation of casket sales 
to funeral directors.78  It also found that the economic protectionism 
resulting from the statute was not a legitimate state interest because it 
was not “economic protectionism in service of the public good 
but . . . ‘economic’ protection of the rulemakers’ pockets.”79  It also 
explicitly denied that the decision was a return to Lochner.80  Also, in 
Clayton v. Steinagel, the District of Utah found that Utah’s cosmetology 
licensing scheme failed rational basis review as applied to an African 
hair braider because the “facts demonstrate an insufficient rational 
relationship between public health and safety and the actual regulatory 
scheme.”81 
C. The Equal Protection Provisions in the Kentucky State Constitution 
While the Maxwell’s plaintiffs’ primary argument centered on the 
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, they also argued that the 
 
 73. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 920 (2005). 
 74. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978, 981–82, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2008).   
 75. Id. at 991.  
 76. Id. at 992.  
 77. St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2013).   
 78. Id. at 223–26.  
 79. Id. at 226–27. 
 80. Id. at 227.  
 81. Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1215 (D. Utah 2012). 
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legislation was barred by the equal protection provisions in the 
Kentucky Constitution.82  The relevant language reads as follows:  
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and 
inalienable rights . . . .  Absolute and arbitrary power over the lives, 
liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in 
the largest majority.  All men, when they form a social compact, are 
equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or 
privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in consideration 
of public services . . . .83  
Additionally, Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution include 
prohibitions on “special legislation.”84  In this context, special 
legislation is “that which favors a special interest to the detriment of the 
rest of society.”85  
The Kentucky Supreme Court has found that the combination of these 
provisions gives additional protection for individual rights against 
legislative interference, prompting the court “at times to apply a 
guarantee of individual rights in equal protection cases that is higher 
than the minimum guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”86  This 
higher standard requires a “reasonable basis” or a “substantial and 
justifiable reason” for discriminatory economic regulations.87  The party 
claiming the validity of a challenged classification has the burden of 
proving a valid nexus between that “classification and the purpose for 
which the statute in question was drafted.  There must be substantially 
more than merely a theoretical basis for a distinction.  Rather, there must 
be a firm basis in reality.”88  While it is unclear whether the “substantial 
and justifiable reason” standard applies in all cases,89 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court has stated that its standard for evaluating economic 
legislation, “while deferential, is certainly not demure,”90 and that a law 
that fails traditional rational basis review (as in Williamson) will also 
 
 82. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Maxwell’s Pic-
Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H). 
 83. KY. CONST., §§ 1–3.  
 84. Id. §§ 59–60.  Section 59 states: “The General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts 
concerning any of the following subjects, or for any of the following purposes, namely: . . . In all other 
cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.”  Section 60 states: 
“The General Assembly shall not indirectly enact any special . . . act by the repeal in part of a general 
act.” 
 85. Yeoman v. Ky. Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 468 (Ky. 1998).  
 86. Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 418 (Ky. 2005).  
 87. Id. at 418–19.  
 88. Yeoman, 983 S.W.2d at 468. 
 89. “Cases applying the heightened standard are limited to the particular facts of those cases.”  
Elk Horn Coal Corp., 163 S.W.3d at 419.  
 90. Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455, 469 (Ky. 2011).  
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fail the heightened standard.91  Examples of the Kentucky Supreme 
Court applying this heightened standard include striking down a 
worker’s compensation statute that required different standards of proof 
to show different types of pneumoconiosis,92 and striking down a statute 
that provided a special immunity from suit to architects, engineers, and 
builders.93 
D. Does Section Two of the Twenty-First Amendment Affect the 
Analytical Framework? 
While the question presented in Maxwell’s is principally a matter of 
economic Equal Protection, the analysis is possibly complicated by the 
fact that the Kentucky statute in question regulates the sale of alcohol.94  
As such, it must also be analyzed under Section Two of the Twenty-
First Amendment, which reads: “The transportation or importation into 
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or 
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited.”95  This language gives wide latitude to the states in 
how they choose to regulate the sale of liquor,96 and because they are 
economic regulations, they will be held to the rational basis test unless 
they involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class or a fundamental right.97  
Thus, the power to regulate liquor sales is almost limitless.98  However, 
as the Supreme Court noted in Craig v. Boren, the Twenty-First 
Amendment lacks sufficient strength “to defeat an otherwise established 
claim of invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”99  Thus, while there may be a greater presumption in favor of 
validity for state liquor control measures because of the Twenty-First 
Amendment, arbitrary legislation in this area is still presumably 
vulnerable to attack under rational basis review.100 
 
 91. Elk Horn Coal Corp., 163 S.W.3d at 419.  
 92. Vision Mining, Inc., 364 S.W.3d at 473–74.  
 93. Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985).  
 94. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.230(5) (West 1998).  
 95. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2. 
 96. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972).  
 97. Shelley Ross Saxer, License to Sell: Constitutional Protection Against State or Local 
Government Regulation of Liquor Licensing, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441, 484 (1995).  
 98. Id. at 489.  
 99. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976).   
 100. Parks v. Allen, 426 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1970).  
11
Pool: An Easy Case Makes Bad Law: The Misapplication of Heightened Scru
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
342 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
III. THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY’S DECISION IN MAXWELL’S 
PIC-PAC, INC. V. DEHNER 
After dismissing several preliminary challenges to the plaintiffs’ 
claim,101 the court outlined rational basis as the appropriate standard of 
review, noting that “modern application of rational review upholds the 
long-established principal of judicial restraint and deference to 
legislative determinations . . . but also guards against government 
action that is arbitrary or lacks any legitimate purpose.”102  It 
surveyed numerous federal and state court decisions addressing liquor 
control schemes, finding that none were precisely on point, but that 
collectively they stood for the proposition that “when an alcohol control 
statute makes a classification based on how businesses sell alcohol, the 
statute will generally satisfy rational review.  But classifications among 
potential alcohol vendors seemingly without a rational link to a 
conceivable legislative purpose are subject to meaningful judicial 
review.”103  It then began its rational basis analysis.  
The court reiterated that the standard of review did not require the 
state to articulate a particular purpose or rationale for the statute, nor did 
it need to speculate on the legislature’s motives.104  Nevertheless, the 
state suggested six supposedly legitimate state interests to justify the 
statute:  
(1) stricter regulation of more potent alcoholic beverages; (2) curbing 
potential abuse by limiting access to the products; (3) keeping pricing 
among merchants competitive, but not so low as to promote excessive 
consumption; (4) limiting the potential for underage access; (5) limiting 
alcohol sales to premises where personal observation of the purchase 
occurs; and (6) balancing the availability of a controversial product 
between those who want to purchase it and those who seek to ban it.105 
The court could not imagine any other possible interests, and in a 
footnote, pointed out that due to the binding precedent of Craigmiles, 
protecting businesses that currently possess a liquor license from 
competition could not be considered a legitimate state interest.106  
The court then proceeded to address each of these proffered interests 
in turn.  It rejected the idea that the statute served to limit the availability 
 
 101. The Intervening Defendant challenged the plaintiffs’ standing and also argued that their 
claim was barred by a statute of limitations.  Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, pt. 
II (W.D. Ky. 2012).  Neither issue is of relevance to this Note, however, and will not be discussed.   
 102. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 744–45. 
 103. Id. at 746.  
 104. Id. at 746–47.  
 105. Id. at 747.  
 106. Id. at 747 n.10.  
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/9
2013] THE MISAPPLICATION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 343 
of more potent alcoholic beverages because the state failed to 
demonstrate why it distinguished between a “grocery-selling drugstore 
like Walgreens . . . [and] a pharmaceutical-selling grocery store like 
Kroger,” and how that distinction rationally related to limiting higher 
proof alcohol sales.107  The court then acknowledged that keeping 
pricing among merchants competitive, but not too low, was a legitimate 
interest, but also found this justification to be lacking because there was 
no rational relationship between “the degree to which a business sells 
non-grocery items more than it sells grocery items” and its impact on 
liquor and wine prices.108  
The court then tackled the argument that the statute limited access to 
the products, and therefore curbed abuse and underage use.109  It 
acknowledged that Kentucky was free to limit the number of liquor 
outlets so long as it did not do so in an arbitrary manner.110  It found, 
however, that there was no rational relationship between the statute and 
this goal because  
the Statute does not limit package sales of spirits and wine to stores 
whose primary business is the sale of those products.  Instead, it allows 
package liquor licenses to stores whose primary business is anything 
other than groceries or gas . . . .  Thus, the rational bases for limiting 
package liquor licenses to traditional package liquor stores are irrelevant 
here because the Statute does not make this classification.111  
It also rejected the idea that the use of “self-checkout” machines by 
some grocery stores—which give these stores less direct observation of 
sales—justified the statute because drugstores are free under the statute 
to install such machines and continue selling liquor and wine.112 
Finally, the court addressed the justification that grocery stores are 
community gathering centers where people with diametrically opposed 
viewpoints on the sale of intoxicating liquors intermingle.113  According 
to the state, by allowing grocery stores to sell beer but not wine and 
liquor, the legislature was striking a balance between these two 
viewpoints and seeking to limit direct conflict between them.114  The 
court found that while Kentucky was free to prohibit the sale of liquor in 
community gathering centers, it could not arbitrarily limit the 
 
 107. Id. at 748.   
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 749.   
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 750.  
 114. Id. 
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prohibition to some centers but exclude others.115  Such legislative line 
drawing must be necessary and have a rational basis.116  The court 
concluded that this basis was lacking, and that the state simply “wanted 
to limit liquor sales generally and to maintain somewhat the status quo, 
and it did so by arbitrarily distinguishing grocers from all other 
retailers.”117  
It concluded its rational basis review by reiterating that there 
appeared to be no stated reasons in the legislative history for drawing 
this distinction between types of retailers, and that as time has passed, 
the distinctions between grocery stores and drugstores have become 
increasingly insignificant, since most drugstores sell groceries and many 
grocery stores sell prescription drugs.118  And even though the Supreme 
Court held in Williamson that legislatures “must be allowed leeway to 
approach a perceived problem incrementally,” the court did not believe 
that this was what the legislature was doing since “the 74-year-old 
statute has become more arbitrary over time.”119  In short, the court 
found that  
Kentucky ‘may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or 
irrational.’  Here, the attenuated or non-existent relationship between the 
Statute’s classification and any number of potential legislative goals 
leaves the Court with no other conclusion than that the Statute offends the 
Equal Protection Clause and, for that reason, must be struck down as 
unconstitutional.120 
The court briefly addressed the question of whether the statute also 
violated the Kentucky Constitution.  It found that since the statute failed 
traditional rational basis review, it also failed the potentially higher 
standard of review accorded by the Kentucky Constitution, and 
discussed the issue no further.121  It offered no opinion on whether 
Kentucky’s higher standard of review was warranted.122  
 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 751.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 751–52 (citations omitted). 
 121. Id. at Part V.  
 122. Id. at 752. 
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IV. ANALYSIS: THE KENTUCKY CONSTITUTION IS PREFERABLE TO THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AS A MEANS TO INVALIDATE THE LIQUOR 
REGULATIONS 
Maxwell’s Pic-Pac v. Dehner is the latest in a continuing trend of 
federal court decisions that purportedly use rational basis review to 
strike down state economic legislation.  Much of this litigation is the 
work of libertarian public policy organizations who argue that 
“arbitrary” regulations on economic activity infringe on a right to work 
inherent in the U.S. Constitution.  This Part argues that the pattern of 
lower federal courts holding economic legislation to heightened scrutiny 
is not only in violation of controlling Supreme Court precedent but also 
an unwarranted encroachment on federalism and the separation of 
powers.  It will also address Maxwell’s pending appeal to the Sixth 
Circuit, and suggest that a more correct path to strike down the 
Kentucky liquor control regime lies in the Kentucky Constitution.  
A. Why the Trial Court’s Decision is an Application of Rational Basis 
with Bite 
When analyzed under the controlling Supreme Court precedents for 
economic regulations, it is clear that the Maxwell’s court used a 
heightened form of rational basis review.  Traditional rational basis 
review does not require a nexus between the actual, legitimate purpose 
for a law and the classification it creates.123  All that is required is a 
“reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis 
for the classification,”124 which can be built on unsupported speculation, 
and the burden is on the challenging party to negate every possible 
justification for the law.125  
But that is not what happened in Maxwell’s.  First, by throwing out 
the six proffered justifications for the statute one by one, and stopping 
the inquiry there, the court effectively placed a burden of justification on 
the government instead of a burden of negation on the challenging party.  
Second, in stating that “courts must always ensure that some rational 
link exists between a statute’s classification and objective,” it also 
conflated the traditional rational basis test used for economic legislation 
with the heightened test used mainly for politically unpopular groups.126  
While it may be correct to say that classifications must have a rational 
link to their objective, it is clear from precedent that “[i]t is enough 
 
 123. See supra Part II.B.  
 124. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. at 315.  
 126. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 744. 
15
Pool: An Easy Case Makes Bad Law: The Misapplication of Heightened Scru
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
346 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
that . . . it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a 
rational way to correct” a problem.127  As long as the legislature 
reasonably believed a rational link existed, the court is not obligated to 
establish the link through evidence.  
For example, the Maxwell’s court said that the proposed link between 
limiting access to alcoholic beverages and curbing alcohol abuse could 
not be “rational” because there was no rational reason for treating 
grocery stores and gas stations differently from other retailers.128  This, 
however, ignores the precedent from Williamson that explicitly states 
that “reform may take one step at a time.”129  The situation in Maxwell’s 
is analogous to that in Williamson where sellers of ready-to-wear glasses 
were allowed to fit lenses without prescriptions but opticians were not, 
yet the law was allowed to stand for public health reasons.130  The 
Maxwell’s court addressed Williamson by saying that, because the law 
had been in place for seventy-four years, it did not believe the 
legislature was addressing the problem one step at a time.131  However, 
there is nothing in Williamson which requires that each “step” be taken 
within a certain period of time, and it is simply enough that the 
legislature could have reasonably believed the classification would have 
the desired effect—the trial court even acknowledged as much.132  When 
economic legislation is being challenged, the court’s belief in the 
legislature’s wisdom is not traditionally what is at issue.  When 
reasonable people can disagree about the prudence of legislation, courts 
should defer to the legislature, as Justice Holmes stated in his famous 
Lochner dissent: “A reasonable man might think [a law to be] a proper 
measure on the score of health[, while m]en whom I certainly could not 
pronounce unreasonable would [uphold it].  Whether in the latter aspect 
it would be open to the charge of inequality I think it unnecessary to 
discuss.”133  Finally, the Equal Protection Clause has traditionally been 
applied only to strike down invidious discrimination134—
“[d]iscrimination that is offensive or objectionable . . . because it 
 
 127. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (emphasis added).  
 128. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 749.  
 129. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489. 
 130. See id. 
 131. Maxwell’s, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 751.  
 132. “Nevertheless, the State claims that withholding liquor licenses from grocery stores and gas 
stations has some effect on each of the purposes it proffered.  The truth of this assertion is not for the 
Court to question, so long as it was conceivable that the Kentucky legislature could have believed it.”  
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).  
 133. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 134. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489 (1955) (“The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no 
further than the invidious discrimination.”).  
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involves prejudice or stereotyping”135—and that is clearly not what was 
at issue in this case. 
Because the application of heightened rational basis review to 
economic legislation is against the weight of precedent, the question 
becomes whether it is ever proper to apply this heightened standard to 
economic legislation, and if so, when?  Before that issue is addressed, 
however, it is worth briefly discussing what it is about Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence that has created the problematic system of 
distinctions between suspect classes and fundamental rights.  
B. The Origin of the Textual Basis for Applying Heightened Scrutiny to 
Economic Legislation 
The argument for extending exacting standards of judicial review to 
economic legislation has a basis in the text of the Constitution, but 
perhaps only through an accident of history.  Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment addresses two groups: “citizens” and “persons.”  
Citizens are entitled to the privileges or immunities of United States 
citizenship, while all persons, including noncitizens, are entitled to due 
process of law and the equal protection of the laws.136  While the plain 
language of the Amendment seems to indicate that the protection of 
substantive rights would fall into the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
this is not how it has been interpreted.  In the Slaughterhouse Cases,137 
the Supreme Court effectively gutted this Clause by holding that it 
“neither incorporated the Bill of Rights nor protected all rights of 
individual citizens.”138  Instead, the Clause protects only rights of 
federal citizenship, which include “the right to petition Congress, the 
right to vote in federal elections, the right to interstate travel or 
commerce, the right to enter federal lands, [and] the rights of a citizen 
while in the custody of federal officers.”139  This decision is universally 
acknowledged as an incorrect reading of the Clause, but since the Court 
is always reluctant to overturn its own decisions, it subsequently has had 
to look to other provisions of the Constitution to find protection for 
substantive rights, namely the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.140 
 
 135. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (9th ed. 2009).   
 136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 137. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).  
 138. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, § 14.3(b). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See A. Christopher Bryant, What McDonald Means for Unenumerated Rights, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 1073, 1077–80 (2011); Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. 
REV. 601, 631 n.178 (2001) (“Virtually no serious modern scholar—left, right, and center—thinks that 
this is a plausible reading of the Amendment.”).  
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Though Lochner’s use of substantive due process in the economic 
context was rejected, the Court revived the doctrine in the middle of the 
twentieth century as a tool to protect certain “fundamental rights.”141  
Many commentators and Justices have questioned the wisdom of 
“read[ing] a clause evidently about procedures to be a font for 
substantive rights,”142 since doing so strips such rights of an explicit 
textual basis.143  It would certainly make more sense to derive such 
rights from the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not only because of the 
apparent plain meaning of the Clause, but also because fundamental 
rights are more easily understood as rights reserved for individual 
citizens.  By deriving them instead from the Due Process Clause and 
enforcing them through the Equal Protection Clause, the door is opened 
for the following argument: “that the three-tiered approach [to judicial 
review] is inherently unequal because differential treatment among 
different groups should not translate into discriminatory treatment of 
those groups by the Court.”144  In other words, how can protection be 
equal if different classifications are held to different standards?145  This 
distinction between persons and citizens becomes especially relevant to 
the Maxwell’s case because the Supreme Court has held that 
corporations are persons but not citizens.146  As a result, there is a strong 
textual argument for extending exacting standards of judicial review to 
all legislation, economic or otherwise.  
C. The Argument in Favor of Applying Heightened Scrutiny to 
Economic Legislation 
It is the mission of organizations such as the Pacific Legal 
Foundation147 and the Institute for Justice148 to achieve the above 
 
 141. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 27, § 15.7. 
 142. Bryant, supra note 140, at 1079.  
 143. Adam Lamparello, Taking the “Substance” Out of Substantive Due Process and Returning 
Lawmaking Power to the Federal and State Legislatures, 63 S.C. L. REV. 285, 287–88 (2011). 
 144. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). 
 145. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Equal 
Protection Clause is itself a classic paradox, and makes sense only in the context of a recently fought 
Civil War.  It creates a requirement of equal treatment to be applied to the process of legislation whose 
very purpose is to draw lines in such a way that different people are treated differently.  The problem 
presented is one of sorting the legislative distinctions which are acceptable from those which involve 
invidiously unequal treatment.”). 
 146. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869).  Additionally, the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself precludes “citizenship” from corporations: “All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A 
corporation cannot be “born” or “naturalized,” and therefore cannot be a citizen.  
 147. PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION, http://www.pacificlegal.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
 148. THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
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described equality of judicial review as a bulwark against restrictions on 
economic liberty.  These organizations engage in litigation and policy 
work with the intent of restoring economic liberty to its pre-New Deal 
status149 and influencing judges to enforce “constitutional limits on 
government power.”150  In practice, this would entail a return to the 
Lochner era, where practically all legislation would be subject to some 
form of heightened scrutiny.  While an in-depth analysis of this 
viewpoint is outside the scope of this Note, a few points merit attention. 
The foundation of this viewpoint is that the right to work is a 
“fundamental right” under the U.S. Constitution.151  And indeed, the 
Court has acknowledged that, under the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of Article IV, § 2, this right may not be infringed by interstate 
protectionist regulations.152  The argument is that the Court should 
recognize these rights as a matter of substantive due process, or perhaps 
preferably, through a revival of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.153  In either case, the end result would be the same: 
judges properly engaged in determining the government’s actual ends 
for all legislation and whether those ends are legitimate.154 
Proponents of so-called “judicial engagement” argue that judges are 
“abdicating” their proper role in evaluating the constitutionality of 
legislation by hiding behind the rational basis test.155  They point out 
that, in defending legislation under this test, “not only is the government 
invited to dream up entirely post hoc rationalizations for challenged 
legislation, it has no obligation to produce evidence in support of those 
rationalizations either.”156  This could lead to absurd results:  
[T]here are a small handful of states that prohibit self-service gas stations, 
ostensibly for health and safety reasons. . . .  [I]f lower courts actually 
took the rational basis test at face value, it would matter not a whit if 
every legislator who voted for the self-service gas station ban came into 
court and swore on a stack of Bibles that he had only done so because he 
was paid off by the service station lobby.  In other words, as long as the 
health and safety argument is “conceivable,” the fact that it is also 
 
 149. James W. Ely, Jr., Book Review, 15 THE INDEP. REV. 612 (2011). 
 150. Center for Judicial Engagement, THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.ij.org/cje (last 
visited Aug. 27, 2013). 
 151. Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 898, 902–03 (2005) [hereinafter Neily, No Such Thing]. 
 152. For example, a state may not bar nonresidents from becoming attorneys.  See Supreme Court 
of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).  
 153. Clark Neily, Judicial Engagement Means No More Make-Believe Judging, 19 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1053, 1062 (2012) [hereinafter Neily, Judicial Engagement]. 
 154. Id. at 1056.  
 155. Neily, No Such Thing, supra note 151, at 903.  
 156. Id. at 900 (internal quotations omitted).  
19
Pool: An Easy Case Makes Bad Law: The Misapplication of Heightened Scru
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
350 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
perfectly fraudulent has no bearing on the outcome of a legal 
challenge.157 
In addition, the requirement that the challenging party negate every 
conceivable justification for a law is “technically impossible to meet 
because it is impossible to prove the non-existence of something as a 
matter of formal logic.”158  Finally, they argue, the test is so flawed that 
the Supreme Court must “misappl[y]” it “in order to achieve preferred 
outcomes,” as was demonstrated in Cleburne and Romer.159 
Certainly, these are strong arguments.  It seems fairly obvious that 
traditional rational basis review creates a situation where “the deck is 
stacked so thoroughly against a litigant that the result of the case is 
effectively preordained.”160  Frankly, this result was almost certainly the 
Court’s intention in formulating the rational basis test as it has.  The 
Court likely wanted to remove itself from the business of reviewing 
every piece of legislation that came its way and in response created a 
test that was practically impossible for the government to fail.  The 
proponents of “judicial engagement” argue that it is time for judges to 
cease the “abdication” of their proper role and demand legitimate 
reasons for government regulation.161  
It is this word “abdication” that is of interest for the purposes of this 
Note.  In his Maxwell’s opinion, Judge John G. Heyburn II twice states 
that “deference” to the legislature does not equal “abdication.”162  His 
use of the word “abdication” in this context is curious, considering that 
Judge Heyburn, according to a Westlaw search, has never before used it 
in a decision.163  One could draw the conclusion that Judge Heyburn is 
familiar with the call for “judicial engagement” and its underlying 
philosophy, and is choosing to “engage” by subjecting the Kentucky 
legislation to heightened scrutiny.  Perhaps it is just a coincidence, but 
the use of such a loaded word in the context of rational basis review 
certainly begs the question.  
Regardless of the motivation behind the decision, Maxwell’s joins 
 
 157. Id. at 908–09.  
 158. Id. at 909.  
 159. Id. at 910.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Neily, Judicial Engagement, supra note 153, at 1070.  
 162. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744, 751 (W.D. Ky. 2012). 
 163. A WestlawNext search of Kentucky District Court opinions written by Judge John G. 
Heyburn II produced 1,923 results (Heyburn has only judged in the Western District of Kentucky).  A 
search within those results for the string “abdicat!” produced two results.  The result other than 
Maxwell’s is from U.S. v. Ware, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 (W.D. Ky. 2001).  In that opinion, Heyburn 
was quoting language from Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).  Heyburn, therefore, appears to 
have only deliberately chosen to use a form of “abdicate” in the Maxwell’s opinion.  A Lexis search 
produced essentially the same results.  
20
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/9
2013] THE MISAPPLICATION OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY 351 
several others in the category of federal litigation seeking to strike down 
economic regulations under the rational basis test.164  If these cases have 
anything in common, it is that they all seem to involve easy questions.  
Surely, can’t reasonable people agree that Kentucky’s liquor controls 
make no sense, or that African hair braiders should not be subject to 
hundreds of hours of unnecessary cosmetology training, or that casket 
retailers do not need training in mortuary science?  Aren’t such laws 
“uncommonly silly?”165  
D. Why Deference to the Legislature on Economic Matters is Good 
Jurisprudence for Federal Courts 
The problem, of course, is that sometimes easy cases can also make 
bad law.166  By continuing the misapplication of the rational basis test 
begun in Cleburne, lower courts continue to muddle the standard and 
call into question when and how it is to be used.  These decisions are 
motivated by laissez-faire principles, and are essentially about 
substituting the wisdom of the courts for the wisdom of the 
legislature.167  Perhaps this results in better policy, but “the post-
Lochner line of cases clearly repudiate judicial efforts to enshrine 
economic policies, even if ultimately wise, as constitutional rights.”168  
Despite the textual flaws in its formulation, the post-Lochner 
treatment of economic legislation is the correct policy.  Equal protection 
may not really be equal, but neither does the First Amendment’s “no 
law” language really mean no law.  Governments cannot operate in 
absolutes, and placing the burden on state governments to justify every 
regulation they enact under the police power would be a huge 
encroachment on federalism.  Since they are appointed to lifetime terms 
and not elected, Article III judges are politically unaccountable, and 
while this perhaps makes them ideal to combat invidious discrimination 
and infringements on fundamental rights, giving them the ability to 
substantively evaluate the legislature’s wisdom in every case is a bridge 
too far.  The counter is, of course, that the right to work, or practice a 
lawful trade, is a fundamental right that courts have only recently 
 
 164. See supra Part II.B.  
 165. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
 166. The original adage, “hard cases make bad law,” appears to derive from Baron Rolfe’s 
opinion in Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ct. of Exchequer) 
(Rolfe, B.) (“Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”).  Rolfe was 
referring to cases that “tempt a judge to stretch or even disregard a principle of law at issue.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 784 (9th ed. 2009).  It goes without saying that the adage is applicable to Maxwell’s. 
 167. Gorod, supra note 15, at 543. 
 168. Id. 
 
21
Pool: An Easy Case Makes Bad Law: The Misapplication of Heightened Scru
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
352 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
decided to eschew.  But the fact is that seventy-five years of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence explicitly rejects the idea of any economic right 
being fundamental, and the Court has given no indication that a return to 
Lochner is warranted or desirable.  
Consider the consequences of such a return.  Imagine that a state 
legislature, or perhaps even Congress, has chosen to institute a single-
payer healthcare system, thus largely eliminating the need for private 
medical insurance.  Could private insurers then challenge the law and 
demand it be subject to heightened scrutiny on the grounds that it 
infringes their “right to practice a lawful trade?”  After all, these 
companies are persons, and theoretically entitled to the equal protection 
of the laws.  One could counter that this hypothetical is in no way 
comparable to the situation in Maxwell’s or its brethren—“those cases 
are about silly laws that make no sense!”  But this is the ultimate 
problem with applying heightened scrutiny to economic legislation: 
where do we draw the line, and who decides where it is drawn?  Which 
is preferable: letting unelected federal judges make policy decisions or 
representative legislatures?  There may be no clear philosophical 
answer, but the Constitution comes down heavily on the side of 
federalism and separation of powers, while it is silent on the matter of 
economic rights.  Alexander Hamilton certainly did not imagine the 
judiciary to sit as a super-legislature when he wrote: “liberty . . . would 
have every thing to fear from [the judiciary’s] union with either of the 
other [branches of government]. . . .  The complete independence of the 
courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”169  
Lower courts should therefore follow precedent and stop subjecting 
economic regulations to heightened judicial scrutiny: “Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate . . . [and] not prohibited . . . are constitutional.”170 
However, the application of this proper deferential standard can still 
be flawed.  Courts are not necessarily obligated to assume, as the 
Powers court did, that any proffered state objective, including economic 
protectionism, is legitimate just so that an economic regulation can be 
upheld.  Certainly, as the concurring opinion in Powers noted, “[n]o 
case holds that the bare preference of one economic actor while 
furthering no greater public interest advances a ‘legitimate state 
interest.’ . . .  [T]he record . . . support[s] a conclusion that the 
[regulation] here furthers, however imperfectly, an element of consumer 
protection.”171  Because the scheme was conceivably related to a 
legitimate interest, the Tenth Circuit should have stopped the inquiry 
 
 169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 170. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819). 
 171. Powers v. Harris, 379 F.3d 1208, 1226 (10th Cir. 2004) (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
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there and ignored the question of economic protectionism entirely, 
avoiding the circuit split simply by explaining that there was a 
conceivable basis for the regulation.  Likewise, the Western District of 
Kentucky in Maxwell’s should have recognized that the classification 
was flawed, but that the state’s proffered bases for the regulation were 
within the bounds of reason, and ceased its Fourteenth Amendment 
inquiry.172 
E. What Will Happen on Appeal? 
The question remains: what will become of the Maxwell’s decision at 
the Sixth Circuit?  As explained throughout this Note, a proper 
application of rational basis review would certainly cause the decision to 
be overturned.  However, the Sixth Circuit showed in Craigmiles that it 
was willing to apply heightened scrutiny to economic legislation, and 
circuit courts are ostensibly obligated to follow their own precedents.  
The question then is to what extent Craigmiles can be distinguished 
from Maxwell’s and also to what extent the political leanings of the 
individual circuit judges will impact their decisions.  It seems fair to 
assume that the latter question could be determinative, and therefore, 
that the fate of Maxwell’s rests in large part on chance—in other words, 
which judges will be assigned to the case.173  But these issues can be 
rendered irrelevant if the statute is instead evaluated under the Kentucky 
Constitution’s equal protection provisions.  
F. Why the Kentucky Constitution May Allow the Classification to Be 
Struck Down 
The Kentucky Constitution allows for a higher standard of review 
than traditional rational basis review to be applied to legislative 
classifications.174  This standard is indeed very similar to the rational 
basis with bite standard applied by the Supreme Court: there must be a 
substantial and justifiable reason for a classification and the party 
claiming validity must prove a valid nexus between classification and 
purpose.  In fact, the trial court in Maxwell’s applied such a standard: 
since Kentucky could not prove that the classification/purpose nexus 
existed, the statute was struck down.175  It is interesting, then, that the 
trial court did not substantively address the question of the statute’s 
 
 172. “Where there are plausible reasons for Congress’ action, our inquiry is at an end.”  F.C.C. v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993). 
 173. This information is not publicly released until two weeks prior to the hearing. 
 174. See supra Part II.C.  
 175. Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733, 752 (W.D. Ky. 2012). 
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validity under the Kentucky Constitution, since it arguably had a greater 
license to apply heightened scrutiny under Kentucky law than under 
federal law.  
A few questions remain, however.  First, whether the classification at 
issue is “special legislation.”  It is arguable that this law is one that 
“favors a special interest to the detriment of the rest of society.”176  The 
intervening defendant acknowledged as much by stating that its 
motivation for intervention was protecting its economic interest in the 
continuance of the current liquor control scheme.177  Arguing that the 
law is special legislation is problematic, however, since the original 
purpose for the law is unknown.  It also does not appear to be necessary 
that the law qualify as special legislation for Kentucky’s heightened 
standard of review to apply.178  Next, since the Kentucky Supreme 
Court has limited the heightened standard of review to the facts of 
particular cases, and has not delineated the controlling factors for its use, 
it is unclear whether this statute would qualify as a circumstance for the 
use of the standard.  It does seem, however, that a sufficient amount of 
Kentucky Supreme Court precedent calls for “a substantial and 
justifiable reason apparent . . . from some . . . authoritative source” to 
allow “discriminatory legislation” to be upheld.179  Finally, it must be 
determined if the legislation fits into the public services exception found 
in section three of the Kentucky Constitution (“no grant of exclusive, 
separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or 
set of men, except in consideration of public services”).180  In this 
context, public services appears to refer to hospitals, the military, social 
safety nets, etc., so this exception likely would not apply.181  
In addition to requiring a “substantial and justifiable reason” for 
discriminatory legislation,182 the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated 
that if “it is clear [a] statute has no reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose and is arbitrary and discriminatory and without 
substantial basis,” then it is proper to strike it down.183  The Maxwell’s 
court found the law fit this profile, so the state constitution may 
 
 176. Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 468 (Ky. 1998). 
 177. Motion to Intervene at ¶¶13, 22, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 
(W.D. Ky. 2012) (No. 3:11-CV-18-H). 
 178. See, e.g., Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455 (Ky. 2011) (applying the 
“substantial and justifiable reason” standard without identifying the legislation at issue as “special 
legislation”).  
 179. Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Ky. 1985).  
 180. KY. CONST., § 3.  
 181. See, e.g., Ky. Bldg. Comm’n v. Effron, 220 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1949); Bowman v. Frost, 158 
S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1942); Bosworth v. Harp, 157 S.W. 1084 (Ky. 1913).  
 182. Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 418–19 (Ky. 2005). 
 183. Reeves v. Simons, 160 S.W.2d 149, 151–52 (Ky. 1942). 
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therefore be a proper avenue to strike the statute down on appeal if the 
Sixth Circuit were to determine that the U.S. Constitution did not 
provide an avenue.  The Maxwell’s court missed an opportunity by not 
certifying the question of whether Kentucky state law bars this statute to 
the Kentucky Supreme Court, as, based on an analysis of precedent, 
there is a good chance that it would find the law unconstitutional.  The 
Sixth Circuit should not make the same mistake: in the interest of 
federalism and the separation of powers, it should find the law 
acceptable under the Federal Constitution, and look to the Kentucky 
Supreme Court for guidance on the state constitutional issue.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Justice Marshall’s Cleburne prophecy has proven true: lacking a 
foundation and a clear direction from the Court regarding its use, lower 
federal courts are applying heightened scrutiny to economic legislation 
and taking steps toward a return to the Lochner era.  In striking down as 
unconstitutional the Kentucky liquor control regulation which explicitly 
prohibits grocery stores and gas stations from selling wine and liquor, 
the Western District of Kentucky joins these courts in incorrectly 
applying a heightened standard of judicial review inappropriate for 
economic legislation.  And although the correct result on appeal is 
dictated by Supreme Court precedent, the statute’s fate on appeal is 
unclear.  The Sixth Circuit has applied rational basis with bite to 
economic legislation in the past and could potentially choose to do so 
again.  Doing so would exacerbate a circuit split and further muddle the 
standards for when heightened scrutiny is appropriate.  If the Sixth 
Circuit believes the statute should be struck down, it should instead look 
to the Kentucky Constitution, which gives greater leeway for the 
application of heightened standards of review to economic legislation.  
Ultimately, it is not for politically unaccountable Article III judges to 
use the U.S. Constitution as a pretext to meddle in the affairs of 
legislatures, except for the limited circumstances where invidious 
discrimination or fundamental rights are involved.  As Justice Thomas 
explained:  
[E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, 
fairness, or logic of legislative choices.  In areas of social and economic 
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines 
nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of 
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.184  
 
 184. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (emphasis added).  
25
Pool: An Easy Case Makes Bad Law: The Misapplication of Heightened Scru
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
356 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
Lower federal courts need to get back to following this directive.  It is 
not an “abdication” to defer to the legislature in these matters, because 
their proper role is deference.  Legislatures may be imperfect, but at 
least we can “throw the rascals [or bastards, bums, etc.] out” if we are 
dissatisfied with their job.185  Those who complain that it is too difficult 
to effect change via the legislature should perhaps concern themselves 
with the underlying reasons for legislative failings instead of pushing a 
Lochnerian agenda in federal court.  
POST-SCRIPT 
As this article was going to press in January 2014, the Sixth 
Circuit overruled the district court’s decision in Maxwell’s Pic-Pac v. 
Dehner and reinstated the Kentucky statute and regulations relating 
to package liquor licenses. In its brief opinion, the court cited to 
F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc. and found Kentucky’s liquor 
laws were acceptable because “reasonably conceivable facts support 
the contention that grocery stores and gas stations pose a greater risk 
of exposing citizens to alcohol than do other retailers.”186 The court 
noted that “Kentucky law occasionally subjects economic policies to 
stricter standards,” but did not consider whether this standard should 
be applied to the laws because “the [appellees] contend only that the 
statute lacks a rational basis.”187  
Though this author agrees with the Sixth Circuit’s decision, it is 
disappointing that the question of the laws’ validity under the 
Kentucky Constitution was neither considered by the court nor 
argued by the parties. Full consideration of this question would have 
provided more finality to this litigation; it remains to be seen whether 
the Plaintiffs will now pursue their case in Kentucky state court.188  
While this case came to the correct conclusion both for 
jurisprudential and public policy reasons, it is important to note that 
the other, similar cases discussed in this Note (e.g., Clayton v. 
Steinagel, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille) have not been similarly 
overturned, and in fact, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in St. 
Joseph Abbey v. Castille.189 For that reason, there is still the potential 
 
 185. “The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident 
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is 
generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”  Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).  
  186.  Maxwell’s Pic-Pac v. Dehner, Nos. 12–6056, 12–6057, 12–6182, 2014 WL 128129 at *3, --- 
F.3d ---- (6th Cir., Jan. 15, 2014).  
  187.  Id. 
  188.  Defeat would be all but certain for the Plaintiffs at the Supreme Court.  
  189.  Castille v. St. Joseph Abbey, 134 S. Ct. 423 (2013).  
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for lower courts to improperly extend higher scrutiny to economic 
legislation, and this trend should be carefully monitored.  
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